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Financing the Manufacturer:
Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code
By OscAR SPnrAcK °

As an introduction to the provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, it would be well first to examine some of the
problems involved in financing a manufacturer. Although the
example used for this purpose concerns a manufacturer of cigarettes, cigars and pipe tobacco, the financing problems involved
would be much the same for other manufacturers.
In order for the cigarette manufacturer to have a package of
cigarettes available for sale to the consumer at the drugstore
counter, he first must assemble or acquire, either directly or
indirectly, the crop of tobacco from the tobacco farmer. Now,
part of his preparation of that crop might include ageing the
tobacco or in some way warehousing it for a certain period of
time in order to make it ready for processing into cigarettes or
pipe tobacco. Once he has accumulated this crop and begins to
process the tobacco, certain chemicals and other materials may
be added to the tobacco. More important, something is going
to be done to the tobacco leaf. It is going to go through certain
machines, and the tobacco leaf is going to be cut up and processed, both through a mechanical operation and by the employment of human labor, into a piece of goods that can be finally
shaped into a cigarette. There is going to be added to this
processed tobacco the paper that goes around it to make the
cigarette. And today, there may be added at the tip some sort
of filter. In addition to the major commodity which he must
acquire from the farmer he must go through the atomic energy
laboratories and pick up the filter materials.
0 Member of the Pennsylvania Bar, B.S. 1949, LL.B. 1952, Temple University. Member, Wexler, Mulder & Weisman, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
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The manufacturer is going to have this cigarette available
for the consumer, at the tobacco confectioner's counter, perhaps
eighteen months, two years, or three years after he has acquired
the crop from the farmer. During that interval, there will be the
expense and cost of storing the tobacco; the expense and cost of
paying for additional materials that go into making up the cigarettes, and the expense and cost of paying the employees who
will assist in the processing of the cigarette. In addition, great
sum of money will be spent on television, billboard and magazine advertising in order to induce the consumer to buy this
cigarette. But the manufacturer is not going to realize a dime
from that tobacco crop until perhaps three years later, when a
package of cigarettes has been sold over the counter. Many
people have been involved in handling that cigarette during
this three-year interval. How is the manufacturer going to pay
for all these things until he has the cigarette ready for sale and
consumption? That is the problem that the tobacco manufacturer
faces. Of course, the tobacco manufacturer might be considered
a poor example, because I doubt if the American Tobacco Company or Reynolds or some of the others really have any problem
in arranging for financing, but if we translate this process to a
small furniture manufacturer who makes up bedroom and dining
room suites and has perhaps ten employees, we can see that
this is a real problem that most types of industry must face.
If we analyze the cycle that I have tried to illustrate, and
examine the financial requirements of this manufacturer, we can
see four or five occasions along the way when it may be possible
for the manufacturer to acquire some capital with which to work
towards the end product. First of all, if we are dealing with
a responsible manufacturer who have been in business for some
period of time, there is no doubt that he is going to have some
credit established with the banks. Perhaps he will have an open
line that will permit him to carry on daily operations-to keep
his factory running and pay overhead, electricity and similarbut which, in all probability, will not permit him to pay many
thousands of dollars to farmers so that he can acquire their tobacco crops.
Secondly, there are available credit lines based on collateral
security that the manufacturer may be able to offer a lender.

1960]

FiNANCING

=

MANuFAcruR

Some of the security that he can offer might be in the form of
fixed assets-real estate and machinery and equipment. In all
probability, however, in acquiring the real estate and the machinery and equipment, he has already had to mortgage those
assets to pay for them. So, as a general proposition, a manufacturer very seldom has available this fixed type of collateral to
finance his manufacturing operation.
What then is left? There is the tobacco crop, the tobacco in
the process of being converted into cigarettes, and perhaps,
after he has sold the cigarettes on credit to his distributors and
to his dealers, the created account receivable represented by
the money that his buyers owe him.
Unfortunately, until recently unless this type of collateral
was in the possession of the lenders, it was not often recognized
by the law as good security. The reason for this was that the
law traditionally favored security as being the rigid, fixed type of
asset such as real property. Of course, the very nature of inventory as collateral precludes it from having any economic
utility if it is going to be possessed by the lender in such a way
that the borrower cannot process it or sell it. If you analyze what
inventory is, you can, of course, see that we are dealing with
something that is changing. Something that changes not only
when it is converted from the tobacco leaf through the manufacturing process into the cigarette, but also in another respect.
As new tobacco crops are processed into cigarettes, the finished
product leaves the manufacturer and is delivered to customers.
The stock of inventory maintained by the manufacturer is then
supplemented by new crops of tobacco. Thus we have a dual type
of change. There is a change in the inventory as a result of the
manufacturing process and a change in adding to and subtracting from the stock of goods as raw materials are purchased and
finished products are sold.
In Kentucky there never has been recognition of an effective
lien on this dual shifting type of collateral. Never having enacted
statutes such as the Factor's Lien Act or even the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act, it has been virtually impossible in Kentucky to
obtain a lien that would shift and follow collateral as collateral
changed in form and substance.
It is necessary to use an historical approach in order to
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explain how the law has developed to the point where this
floating or shifting lien may now be used to enable the manufacturer to secure adequate financing. Historically, working capital
was first obtained by the manufacturer by utilizing accounts
receivable as collateral. In most manufacturing operations, sales
of the finished product are made to the distributors or the dealers
on open lines of credit of thirty, sixty or ninety day terms. This
increases the problem of the manufacturer as he does not get his
cash at the time he makes the sale, but he must wait up to three
months for payment.
The use of accounts receivable as a means of financing originated in the textile industries in New England where it sprang
from the concept of the common-law factor. A factor then was
much different than what we call a factor today. Actually, a
factor was a sales agent for a manufacturer-a commission merchant-one who would sell goods on behalf of a manufacturer,
and as compensation for that sale, wolud receive a commission.
Because of the way the textile industry worked in the early
days of factoring, the sales were generally made from the place
of business of the factor rather than the place of business of the
manufacturer. Thus, the factor had in his possession the goods
that he was offering for sale. If a factor made a sale, and the
manufacturer incurred an obligation to pay the factor his commission, it was a simple problem for the factor to have a lien
to secure his commission because he had goods of the manufacturer in his possession.
Eventually the factors became more financially able and responsible than the manufacturers, so that in addition to selling
goods, they began to lend money to finance the manufacturer
of goods. As security for these loans, the factors had a lien on
the finished goods which they p6ssessed for the purpose of sale.
The common law factor's lien was a possessory one, which the
factor could enforce by foreclosing on the collateral in his
possession.
Later in this development the factor began to do something
more. He would not only sell on behalf of the manufacturer,
but he would guarantee to the manufacturer that the person to
whom he sold would pay the invoice, and for doing this, he
would receive an additional commission.
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It was not lbng until the factor, in addition to guaranteeing
the payment of accounts, started to discount them and advance
the invoice prices to the manufacturer before the expiration
of the credit term or period. For this function of "cashing sales"
the factor charged interest for the use of his money by the
manufacturer from the date of the advance to the date of actual
payment by the customer. Of course, if the credit of the customer
was guaranteed by the factor, the interest charges ceased on
the due date of the invoice whether the customer paid or not.
This kind of account receivable lending was accomplished
very simply. When the invoice went out it would be mailed by
the factor to the customer and the invoice would state, "This
account is assigned to and payable only to the XYZ Factoring
Company." Thus, everybody had notice of the transaction, and
nobody seemed to object to the disclosure that this particular
textile mill was being financed by a factor.
With' the changing economy the merchandising of goods
changed. The factor was no longer needed in modem day selling as an agent to handle and distribute goods. He was still
virtually needed to finance manufacturing operations. As a consequence, there developed a statutory factor's lien device.1
By complying with the Factor's Lien Act, the factor was able
to accomplish substantially the same result in the way of a lien
on the manufacturer's inventory and receivables as was possible
when the factor actually possessed the inventory for purposes
of sale. In lieu of possession, the statute substituted a form of
public notice designed to tell anyone who might deal with the
manufacturer that the assets-the receivables and inventorywere subject to a factor's lien even though physical possession
of the inventory remained with the manufacturer. This notice
generally took one of two forms. First, the manufacturing premises would be posted with signs advising anyone who walked
into the plant that the goods in the plant were subject to a

factor's lien; and secondly, a notice would be filed in some
central or local filing office so that any person checking the
record could observe and learn that some arrangement existed
1
Including states which have enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, 32
states now have statutory factors' lien provisions. The first Factors' Lien Act was
adopted in New York in 1911 and has since been amended several times. It now
constitutes section 45 of its Personal Property Law.
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between the factor and the manufacturer.' This was a recognition in effect, by the law, of the floating or shifting type of lien.
If the above discussion is analyzed, it should be seen that
one of the important attributes of this type of lien was that it
was on a type of goods that changed and that the object of the
entire financing transaction was to create a finished product
which could be sold and converted into cash. The factor's lien,
logically, since it was already a type of shifting lien on the
inventory itself, could easily then shift to the proceeds of the
sale (either the cash received by the manufacturer or the account receivable, if, as was usually the case, the sales were credit
transactions).
The factor situation had one serious drawback in areas
other than the textile field. The account receivable part of the
financing was on a notification basis, so that the customers of
the manufacturer knew that his accounts receivable had been
given as security or were not his property. In order to make
this type of financing available to other segments of the manufacturing economy, there had to be devised a way to accomplish
the same thing without tipping off or telling the buyer that the
account was assigned. There developed in the finance industry
a mechanical way of buying accounts receivable or lending
money on the security of accounts which did not require that
the account debtor, as he is called under the Uniform Commercial Code, be notified that the money which he has to pay
actually belongs to the finance company, the factor, or the bank.
This was accomplished in many states by a statutory recognition of non-notification financing. To some extent it was
accomplished in other states by a judicial recognition that nonnotification financing gave the assignee of the receivable complete and total ownership of the accounts receivable, even
though no notice of any kind was given to the person who
owed the money.
In the common law states where no statutory implementation
ever arose, this was accomplished by saying that if X assigned
his accounts to Y, Y was the owner of that account, even though
A, the person who owed the money, never knew about it, and
2

The sign-posting originally required in some of the factors' lien statutes

has now been eliminated from all of them.
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even if X assigned that account thereafter to another assignee.
The court would say, insofar as the second assignee was concerned, that X had no interest left in the account to assign to
the second assignee, and therefore Y still had a good account
receivable. The court would say the same thing, if, for example,
a creditor of X levied an attachment or garnishment on the
account debtor. In such event the creditor obtained nothing
because the account debtor no longer owed X any money:
everything that was due X had been assigned to Y.3
In other states, where these rules were rejected and the
attaching creditor or 'the second assignee, if he gave notice
first, was held to prevail against the first assignment, a bookmarking statute was adopted, under which non-notification
financing could still be accomplished if the assignor at the time of
assignment was required to make a notation on the ledger sheet
that the account had been assigned.
There are principles which the Uniform Commercial Code
has incorporated into Article 9 in order to accomplish the same
result. A great many of the mechanics, some of the devices
like book-marking, some of the formalities like sign-posting,
have been eliminated. The formal requisites have been kept to
a minimum. But under the Code we have an absolute and clear
recognition that it is legally desirable and economically essential that the floating charge on a shifting stock of goods be recognized.
It is interesting to note how Article 9 accomplishes the purpose of permitting the flexible financing of a manufacturer's
inventory, from the raw-materials stage all the way to the proceeds of the sale of the finished product. Essentially, there are
two principles of Article 9 which accomplish the object of the
floating lien. The first method is the abolition of a long-standing
rule which is based upon Benedict v. Ratner. The abolition of
the Benedict v. Ratner rule means that the Code recognizes
what a business man would presume the law to be. It distinguishes between what may be called credit control of the debtor
and the legal effectiveness of formal requirements of a mortgage or security interest. 5
3 Fortunato v. Pattern, 147 N.Y. 277 (1895).

4268 U.S. 858 (1925).
5 UCC § 9-205.
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Benedict v. Ratner is a United States Supreme Court decision which involved an interpretation of the law of New York
in a bankruptcy case. In that case, the bankrupt had assigned
its accounts receivables to Ratner, who permitted the bankrupt
thereafter to collect the money from the account debtors, to
deposit the money into his own bank account and to use the
money in the course of his business. The assignment was to
secure loans made by Ratner which were repayable according
to a fixed repayment schedule.
The Supreme Court said that under the law of New York,
because the bankrupt had been permitted to exercise unfettered
dominion over the proceeds of the assigned receivables, the
assignment was fraudulent as against other creditors of the
bankrupt and that a trustee in bankruptcy therefore had superior
rights to the accounts than did the assignee.
The Benedict decision, which was the law of New York as
construed by the Supreme Court of the United States, actually
became a part of the federal bankruptcy law in the sense that
most states that recognize the problem thought or found that
they had the same law as the State of New York. This decision
in effect caused a combination in a secured transaction that the
Code now separates.
The test of legal effectiveness under the Benedict decision
was "how much control did the assignee exercise over the assignor and the receivable proceeds." Despite any practical
credit risks which the assignor chose to assume, if he did not
exercise strict supervision, he lost not only that security which
the assignee may have dissipated or dishonestly diverted, he also
lost any legal claim to that which may not have been diverted.
Now, as a practical matter, that does not make too much
sense to' a businessman, although it makes a good deal of logical
sense to a lawyer. If a businessman who lends money to another
businessman is willing to take as security something which he
will permit his debtor to use, whether it be the proceeds of an
account receivable or inventory which he will sell, the lender
is the one who is running the risk that his collateral may be
dissipated. If there is a default, if the loan is not repaid and the
lender has to resort to the collateral and some of it has been
dissipated, that is a risk which the lender assumes, a risk which
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he could guard against by adequately policing his security. If
he does not want to assume the risk, he may guard against it
by policing his security and seeing that the debtor does not make
improper use of the collateral. But if he chooses not to do this,
if he chooses to run a credit risk, why should he be deprived of
legally enforceable rights with respect to what has not been
dissipated?
The Code recognizes and distinguishes between these two
problems, and in section 9-205 the rule of Benedit v. Ratner is
abolished not only with respect to accounts receivable, but also
with respect to any type of collateral where use by the debtor
is permitted. Section 9-205 states:
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against
creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to use, commingle, or dispose of all or part of the collateral (including any return or repossessed goods) or to collect or compromise accounts . . . or to accept the return of goods or
make repossessions, or to use, commingle, or dispose of
proceeds, or by reason of the failure of the secured party
to require the debtor to account for proceeds for replaced
collateral ...
A tremendous protest went up in Massachusetts among
commercial lawyers when they learned that Article 9 of the
Code repealed the Benedit v. Ratner rule. It is of interest to note
that this protest was probably more emotional than actual, because, according to the experts in Massachusetts law, Benedict
v. Ratner had never been the law in Massachusetts. Nevertheless,
its repeal has been a rallying point for opposition to the Code.
If opposition to repeal of the Benedict rule is analyzed, however, it does not make much sense from a sound business point
of view. The creditor who lends money on the strength of collateral security is either going to protect his own security by
adequate policing requirements or run the risk of losing it
through dissipation or even the fraud of his borrower. If he
chooses to run that risk, why should he be penalized by saying,
"Having run that risk, you lose everything even if your trust
was placed in an honest borrower who did not abuse his privilege to use the collateral."
In effect, by the repeal of Benedict v. Ratner (and the recognition of the type of financing that can be accomplished with-
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out Benedict v. Ratner) Article 9 gives protection, not against
a debtor's dishonesty or a debtor's defalcations or diversions, but
against the honest insolvency of a debtor. If one can grasp that
philosophy, if one can understand that Article 9 from a very
practical point of view merely attempts to accomplish protection against a debtor's honest insolvency-then he has the gist
of Article 9.
The older security laws, both at common law and by statute,
sometimes do not recognize that the law can attempt to protect the creditor against an honest insolvent and at the same time
offer no real protection against a dishonest debtor. As a practical matter, there is very little hope of recovery against a dishonest debtor who may have absconded with thousands of dollars of receivable proceeds or who may have diverted tangible
collateral and disposed of it. That debtor may be found. He
may be placed in jail, but as a practical matter, under such
circumstances will the creditor see the benefits of his security?
The Code, recognizing this, does not attempt to give the creditor
that kind of protection in commercial transactions.
The second principle of Article 9 which is designed to effectuate the fluid or flexible type of financing is set forth in sections
9-201 and 9-204.
Section 9-201 is simple enough, but what it says is very
significant:
Except as otherwise provided by this Act, a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties
against purchasers of the collateral and creditors.
In other words, if the parties agree that there is to be a lien
that goes from the cradle to the grave, so to speak, the law will
recognize that agreement. Its very simplicity makes it quite profound, because it is quite different from what will be found in
chattel mortgage statutes or the older type of security law.
To implement section 9-201, section 9-204 was placed in
Article 9. In section 9-204(8), we find that a "security agreement may provide that collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure
all obligations covered by the security agreement," thus recognizing that after-acquired property can fall under the lien or
security interest of a prior transaction. This makes it possible,
then, for the lien to revolve in fact, because in the inventory
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manufacturing cycle, where goods move in and move out, and
move back in, you cannot have this flexible type of lien without
a broad after-acquired property clause.
A word of caution is necessary. The after-acquired property
clause that is necessary for this type of lien and which section
9-204 recognizes is limited to commercial transactions. By this
is meant that this type of clause will be given effect only when
the parties who are involved in the agreement are business
people, when one is a manufacturer and the other is a lender,
a bank, or a finance company. Section 9-204(3) does not apply
to a case where the debtor or borrower is a consumer, one who
buys the goods or has the goods that he is pledging for his own
personal and family use, or to a farmer with respect to his crops.
Section 9-204(4), pertaining to farm crops provides:
No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause (a) to crops which become such more than
one year after the security agreement is executed....
This is in line with the existing Kentucky law,> except that
under section 9-204(4) a "security interest in crops which is given
in conjunction with a lease or a land purchase or improvement
transaction evidenced by a contract, mortgage, or deed of trust,
may, if so agreed, attach to crops to be grown on the land concerned during the period of such real estate transaction." In
other words, if the after-acquired property clause is in an agreement with a farmer-borrower, who is negotiating only with regard to his crops, the crops must come into existence within
a year in order to be subject to the lien, unless the farmer is
giving a lien on future crops in conjunction with a real estate
transaction, a mortgage on his farm, a lease on the farm, or the
like.
No security interest attaches under the after-acquired property clause to consumer goods (other than accessions) unless the
debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after the secured
party gives value. In the case of a consumer there cannot be
a valid all-embracing mortgage which goes beyond ten days
or purports to cover property acquired by the debtor more than
ten days after the secured party has given his value. In commercial transactions there is no time limit, and the broadest
6

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 882.610 (1)(b) (1959).
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possible after-acquired property clause will be effective to accomplish the floating lien.
Section 9-204 contains another provision which implements
this philosophy, and which again is an extension of the present
law. Section 9-204(5) states:
Obligations covered by a security agreement may include
future advances or other value whether or not the advances
or value are given pursuant to commitment.
One can enter into a valid agreement today and perfect his
security interest by the appropriate filing, even though the
secured party is not to make his advance until some time in the
future. If he does make his advance in the future, he has a
security interest which has priority from the date of perfection
(i.e., filing) rather than the date of the advance. This changes
Kentucky law in the following respect: previously where a lien
secured a future advance, the priority of that lien dated only
from the time of the actual advance unless the lender was under
a binding and legally enforceable commitment to make the advance in the future. The Code removes that restriction and says
that the priority dates from the time of the agreement and perfection of the security interest if the advance is subsequently
made, regardless of whether or not the lender was legally obligated to make it. If he is under no legal duty, and he makes
no future advance, then of course the lien secures nothing, and
the debtor can under appropriate provisions of the article secure
the lien's removal from the record.
Section 9-806 is another section which implements and complements this concept. The substance of it is that if there is a
security interest in property that is sold or disposed of by the
debtor, the security interest continues in any proceeds that come
into existence as a result of that sale or disposition.
When we deal with inventory, inasmuch as the very nature
of inventory is such that we contemplate that goods are going
to be disposed of in the ordinary course of business, we find
that section 9-306 logically provides that when the debtor does
sell the goods, the secured party's lien then shifts to the proceeds
of the sale. Generally, the proceeds will either be cash (and unless the secured party can trace that cash or reduce it to posses7

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 382.620 (1959).
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sion, he is in danger of losing that lien) or it will be, in the
commercial situation, an account receivable.
The provisions just discussed will probably face some challenge in the bankruptcy courts, where the concept of the floating lien has not yet been fully recognized. It is all well and
good for the Code to say that an after-acquired property clause
will be given full recognition by the law of Kentucky and that if
a manufacturer acquires raw materials a year after the date
of the original security agreement and the year after the perfection of the security interest, he then has that new inventory subjecto to the earlier lien. But is it not possible that bankruptcy
court will say, "Now, wait a minute, you made an advance a
year ago, and you attempt to say that this property which he is
acquiring today is entitled to the priority of the lien that was
created a year ago. That transfer, that after-acquired property,
may be subject to your lien, but you are taking it at a time that
your manufacturer happens to be insolvent and on account of
an antecedent transaction, and you have reason to know or do
know of his insolvency; therefore, that after-acquired property
can be set aside as a voidable preference."
The Code attempts to overcome in section 9-108 this possible
objection in bankruptcy:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligationfi releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value which is to be secured in whole or
in party by after-acquired property, his security interest
in the after-acquired collateral shall be deemed to be
taken for new value, and not as security for an antecedent
debt.... [Emphasis added.]
The Code is trying to satisfy section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 8
by saying that this after-acquired property is deemed to be taken
for new value rather than an account of an antecedent debt.
In some factual situations this may not be a problem. In others,
the bankruptcy courts might hesitate to say that "deeming"
makes it so.
In the above discussion, we were concerned with the general background of the Code rules pertaining to the floating
lien and how it is effectuated. Attention will now be given to
some of the rules relating to receivables and inventory.
8 11

U.S.C. § 96.
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Discussing accounts receivable financing first, where a seller
has performed by shipping goods to a credit buyer so that the
only thing that remains to be done in the contractual situation
is for the buyer to pay for the goods, the buyer's obligation is
termed an "account receivable." 9
Article 9 applies to all types of accounts receivable financing. 10
While Article 9 and the security interest provided by it is said
to be applicable "to any transaction, regardless of its form,"
which is intended as security, some question is possible where
accounts receivable are involved. In the case of accounts receivable, there are two types of transactions which might be
involved in any financing situation. In one, an assignor borrows money and pledges or assigns his accounts receivable as
collateral security for repayment of the debt; this is generally
the type of arrangement the manufacturer will have if a bank or
finance company does the receivable financing. The other way
in which a manufacturer or merchant can finance through re-

ceivables will be to actually discount or sell the receivables;
he will transfer not merely a title for purposes of security, but

he will give actual ownership to someone who buys the receivable and pays for it at face value less whatever discount the
parties agree to.
In the one case we have what is clearly a secured transac-

tion-a loan secured by receivables; in the other case, we have
a sale. Because the situations and the uses made of these two
devices are so similar and because the purpose generally in each
case is the same, Article 9 governs not merely the assignment
for purposes of security, but the rules of Article 9 apply also
to the sale of accounts receivable. 1 It may be determined
whether the Code applies to a particular situation in Kentucky
by determining where the assignor's office is, that is, where the
records are kept. If the records of the assignor are in Kentucky,
Article 9 governs."
In order to perfect either accounts receivable financing
arrangement in the case of a continuous series of transactions
between the assignor and the assignee, there must be filed public
9UCC § 9-106.
10oucc § 9-102(1).
11UCC § 9-102(1)(b).
12UCC § 9-103(1).
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notice of transactions in the office of the county clerk." This is
a notice which is designed to let whoever is interested in searching the record know that as between the manufacturer and the
A bank or finance company, there is an arrangement relating
to the receivables. This notice is not designed to tell anyone
any more than that, but simply to put them on their guard. If
they go to the record and find that there has been a financing
statement (which is the terminology used to describe this notice)
filed on record, then they may go to the parties themselves to
learn whether they are in trouble if they deal with this particular debtor, or whether they can freely look to his receivables
or other assets described in that financing statement.
The financing statement, mentioned above, is a very informal type of instrument. It must be signed by the parties,
and, under section 9-402, it must contain a description of the
collateral. This description may be in the broadest general
terms and merely has to describe the type of collateral involved,
not the specific collateral. Thus, a description such as "account
receivable" would be adequate, the rule being that any description is sufficient as long as it reasonably identifies that which
is being described. The statement must also contain the addresses of the parties. Beyond this, there is no formal requirement.
If the parties have entered into an involved agreement relating to repayment .terms, interest rates, rights of the assignee,
rights of the assignor and similar matters, that agreement binds
both parties with respect to their rights, duties, and obligations,
but that agreement need not be put on record. If the parties
wish to file the actual agreement as a financing statement, they
may do so, since that undoubtedly will meet the minimum requirements of a financing statement. But in most commercial
transactions, the parties will hesitate to spread on the record
the intimate details of their particular agreement.
To the extent that filing in the case of accounts receivable
financing is now the law of Kentucky, this represents a change
in the law. Prior to this, there has been no requirement of,
nor any provisions for, any kind of filing or recording. The
question has often arisen whether this requirement that a fnanc13 UCC §§ 9-802, 9-401.
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ing statement be filed so that the public may have notice of the
transaction destroys whatever utility might exist in not notifying the account debtor that the account is really the property
of the bank. Based upon the experience in Pennsylvania where
there was no filing provision prior to the Code with respect to
receivables, non-notification receivable financing still continues,
even though filing is required in order to perfect it. This is because a customer who buys goods from the assignor will not
ordinarily take the trouble to search the record to learn whether
or not the money he is paying for the goods really belongs to
his seller or to the bank or the finance company. Thus, nonnotification financing will probably continue as before; at least
it has in Pennsylvania.
Where there is an assignment of an occasional account by
a debtor to the bank or the finance company, which is not part
of a series of transactions or part of a receivable-financing
arrangement, the occasional assignment is subject to the rules
of Article 9, except that a financing statement need not be
filed to protect it.
The Code probably changes the law in Kentucky, assuming
that the law of Kentucky is like it is in most states, by repealing what is known as the Caristodoctrine.' 5 The Caristo doctrine
provides that if there is an agreement between the parties to a
contract to the effect that the rights of either of he paries may
not be assigned, that agreement will be given effect.
The Code repeals the Caristo doctrine in section 9-818(4)
by providing that a term in any contract between an account
debtor and an assignor which prohibits assignment of an account
to which they are parties is ineffective. If on the back of an
order form there is a fine-print provision that "We are ordering
goods but one of the conditions of this order is that anything
we may owe you as a result of buying these goods may not be
assigned to someone else" such a provision under section 9-818(4)
would be ineffective, and the assignee acquires whatever rights
the assignor had despite the prohibition.
Of course, to the extent that the ordinary contract rules
relating to assignments make good sense in a commercial set14UCC § 9-302(1)(e).

15Alihusen v. Caristo Const. Corp., 303 N.Y. 446, 103 N.E.2d 891 (1952).
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ting, they are also incorporated or included within the provisions of the Code. Thus, in the case of non-notification financing,
although an account debtor may have actual knowledge of this
financing, if he, in good faith, makes payment of the account to
the assignor, he is discharged. In other words, until actual notification to the account debtor not to pay the assignor but to pay
the assignee, a payment in good faith by him discharges the
obligation.:6 It is up to the assignee to police his assignor and
see that money collected is paid over to him.
A security agreement which provides that the financing is
to be on a non-notification basis may also provide that at the
option of the secured party it can be converted at any time to
a notification basis. Even if the agreement does not so provide,
if the assignor should default, the Code in section 9-502(1)
gives the assignee the right to notify all the account debtors of
the assignment.
It has been the practice to include in commercial security
agreements a provision relating to default which is designed
to be all-embracing and all-inclusive. There is found in many
a security agreement, relating both to receivables and to inventory, a statement that the secured party may terminate the
agreement and demand payment of all outstanding debts upon
the determination by the secured party that his security is or
may become impaired. Article 9, in a commercial transaction, is
not intended as a nursemaid for businessmen who should be
competent enough to know what they are doing and who at
least should know enough to be represented by counsel. Article
9 does not declare such a provision in a security agreement hivalid or in any way repugnant to the purposes of Article 9. A
security agreement is effective between the parties and as against
third parties according to its terms. However, section 1-208
does say that if there is such a clause in an agreement, it may
only be invoked by the secured party in the good-faith belief
that the prospect of payment is actually impaired. Good faith
is defined in the Code as meaning "honesty in fact." Therefore,
theoretically at least an insecurity clause may be invoked only
when there is the honest belief that the prospect of payment is
impaired. The burden of showing lack of good faith is on the
16 UCC § 9-318(3).
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debtor, and this may destroy some of the protection that section
1-208 is designed to give.
We now consider some of the rules of Article 9 with respect
to inventory and equipment. These may come as a surprise to
many lawyers, although not to most businessmen. Many lawyers
are surprised at a system which can give perfection and good
security interest in part of the area and leave it alone in other
parts. By this is meant that lawyers are sometimes surprised
to hear that a perfected security interest in inventory may be cut
off when the inventory is sold to a buyer in the ordinary course
of business; their reaction is, "Well, what good is it? If you
lose your lien, if you lose your mortgage on these goods when
they are sold, what good is the security interest to begin with?"
In examining the purpose that inventory is designed to accomplish, we find the answer to these objections. Inventory will
be sold or disposed of in the ordinary course of business. People
will -buy goods from a merchant only if they are assured that
they need not worry about a chattel mortgage that might exist
on that inventory or a security interest that might exist. Naturally, one who finances inventory contemplates that the inventory
is going to be sold and he expects that he is going to be paid
out of the proceeds of the sale. That is all he is looking for.
So it is not such a surprising thing to fnd that when we deal
with inventory, a buyer of that inventory in the ordinary course
of business will get a good title to the goods, free and clear of
the lien of the secured party. This is logical when we bear in
mind that the draftsmen of the Code were designing rules
to protect a secured party against only the honest insolvency
of the debtor.
By definition, inventory, being something that is to be sold
in the ordinary course of business, consists of goods that are held
by a merchant for sale or disposition. Therefore, the rules relating to inventory apply only to transactions involving merchants and do not apply to transactions where a farmer sells his
crops or a consumer sells his property. A sale does not cut off
the lien of a perfected security interest in the crops of a farmer.
Of course, the buyer-in-the-ordinary-course-of-business concept,
with the cutting off of the security interest by such a buyer, is
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logically complemented by the rule in section 9-306 that the
security interest shifts from the goods so disposed of to the proceeds of the sale.
In the case of inventory financing, there are simple requirements for the financing statement, much like those that apply
to the statement in the case of receivables financing, discussed
above. However, in covering the inventory of a manufacturer,
the description of the collateral should cover not only the end
product that might result from the manufacturing operation, but
the whole mass of his inventory which results or exists as a result
of the manufacturing operations. 17
When the manufacturer already owns equipment, it may be
used as collateral security for future borrowing. Here the law
under the Code will be much the same as it has been under the
Chattel Mortgage Act. No reason is apparent why, after July,
1960, presently-existing mortgage forms could not be used to
cover the situation where a businessman or a manufactirer goes
into a bank and offers a piece of machinery or equipment as
collateral for a loan.
Of course, the broad after-acquired property clause which is
permitted under section 9-204 will enable the mortgagee to
provide in his agreement for a security interest in any replacement of the equipment given as collateral, and, if the parties
agree, it can be made broad enough to cover any other equipment or property that the mortgagor may thereafter acquire.
One further problem to be noted concerns the determination in a given case whether the equipment you are going to
offer as collateral security is personal property or is so annexed
to or made part of the real estate as to constitute a fixture. Section 9-313 contains new provisions relating to this question, and
relating to possible security interests in fixtures.
If the equipment happens to be a motor vehicle (one that
is required to be licensed under the motor vehicle registration
laws) then the manner of perfecting the security interest may
be somewhat different. 8
17UCC
§ 9-315(1)(b).
I8 See recent enactments by the Kentucky General Assembly relating to
security interests in motor vehicles, particularly amendments to Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 186.195.
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CONCLUSION

The courts of Pennsylvania have had an opportunity on perhaps a dozen occasions during the past five years to review and
interpret and apply the Code provisions. In most of those situations, the courts took a very liberal and friendly view toward
the Code, and it is hoped that Kentucky will have the same good
fortune. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was so impressed
with the Code that even before it went into effect in Pennsylvania, the court took occasion to say, in a case where there was
no recent ruling on the point in question, that the Code looked
to it like the best rule on the subject. The court applied the Code
the year before it went into effect in Pennsylvania. 9
There has been some question whether Article 9, especially
in the field of financing a manufacturer or a merchant, now
changes the balance that existed in an insolvency situation and
puts all the aces into the hands of the secured lender or the
mortgagee to the detriment of the general unsecured creditor.
This has not ben the result in Pennsylvania. The experience there
has been that while mechanically it is easier to accomplish the
financing, except for a very few situations, people that took
security before the Code continue to take security after the
Code. That it is relatively easy under the Code to do so has
apparently not been sufficient reason to induce many newcomers to enter the field of secured financing. Therefore, it is believed that the same balance between secured and unsecured
creditors exists under the Code as existed prior to the Code.
19 Thomas v. First National Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910

(1954).

